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The Advocate's Conflicting Obligations Vis-h-Vis
Adverse Medical Evidence in Social Security
Proceedings
Robert E. Rains*
I. THE PROBLEM

The conscientious attorney representing claimants for
disability benefits before the Social Security Administration
(SSA)1 is constantly beset by ethical problems unique to that
clientele in situations for which there is conflicting guidance
under either the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
Rules of Professional Conduct. Additionally, the nature of the
clientele-people who are, or believe they are, either mentally
or physically disabled-creates a set of problems of its own.
Frequently the attorney must deal with a client who believes
that she is disabled by physical impairments, but the attorney
quickly concludes that the primary impairments are mental.
This type of client is often the most resistant to well-meaning
legal advice. Often the attorney must try to assist a client who
suffers from diminished or impaired intellect to make
intelligent decisions regarding complex litigation strategy.
The adjudicatory system within the Social Security
Administration could best be described as convoluted.2 The
underlying law has been aptly described by the United States
Supreme Court as 'Byzantine" 3 and "almost unintelligible."'
* Professor of Law and Director, Disability Law Clinic, The Dickinson
School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1974. The author wishes to thank
Professor Linda Fisher for her assistance in providing material and insights
regarding the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules of Professional
Conduct. I am also indebted to several private practitioners for their insightful
reviews; you know who you are. Opinions contained herein are those of the author.
© Copyright 1994, Robert E. Rains. All rights reserved.
1. The statutory authority for such administrative proceedings to determine
disability is found at 42 U.S.C. § 405(b).
2. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900404.996, 416.1400-416.1494 (1994).
3. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981).
4. Id (quoting Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977)).
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For example, the ancillary law on obtaining adequate legal
fees, either from the client or from the government, is itself
hideously complex, involving different rules depending upon
the specific program involved, constantly changing procedures,
state and federal agencies, and sometimes federal courts.'
Complicating the regulatory and statutory framework for
obtaining fees is an overlay of recent Supreme Court decisions
which are difficult to analyze, if not positively contradictory to
each other.6
Perhaps the most intractable problem facing the
practitioner, however, is that of dealing with medical records or
reports which appear to undercut the client's claim of
disability. While the conflict that exists among competing
duties of zealous or diligent representation 7 , client
confidentiality8 , and candor towards the tribunal9 is obvious,
an appropriate resolution has been elusive. The problem has
been further exacerbated by disputes regarding the ability of
individual administrative law judges, or the Offices of Hearings
and Appeals, to promulgate their own rules and regulations of
procedure, ° and by the increasing concern of attorneys
working in this area about competition from non-attorney
representatives who may not be bound by the Code or the
Rules." Additionally, there is a lack of uniformity among the
few state and local bars which have addressed this issue in

5. The primary statutory bases in Title H actions are 42 U.S.C. § 406 (1988)
and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1989). The law governing Title XVI cases is murky and
incomplete. See Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Shalala v. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. 2625 (1993); Melkonyan v.
Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (1990); Sullivan
v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989). For a good exegesis of the first three cases in this
line, see Gill Deford, Melkonyan v. Sullivan: What Hath the Supreme Court
Wrought?, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 663 (1991). See also Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d
376 (9th Cir. 1994).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1993); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSrUILITY DR 4-101 (1983).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1993); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMEBLITY DR 4-101.
9. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3; MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102, 7-106.
10. See Memorandum from Jose A. Anglada, Acting United States
Administrative Law Judge, Dep't of Health and Human Services Office of Hearings
and Appeals, to Harry C. Taylor, II, Chief Administrative Law Judge, Charleston,
West Virginia, Hearing Office (Apr. 14, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter U.S.
AIJ Memorandum].
11. See James Podgers, Crumbling Fortress, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1993, at 50.
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some fashion 2 and a complete lack of judicial precedent in the
social security context. Compounding the confusion, Congress
has enacted in the Social Security Independence and Program
Improvements Act of 1994, effective October 1, 1994, a
provision to combat fraudulent claims, which contains language
susceptible to interpretation as shedding either heat or light on
the subject. 3
The scope of this problem is enormous. Again, in the words
of the Supreme Court, "The system's administrative structure
and procedures, with essential determinations numbering into
the millions, are of a size and extent difficult to
comprehend." 4 By 1983, the Social Security Administration's
administrative law judges (ALJs) were hearing over 320,000
cases per year. 5 In April 1994, SSA projected 522,000
requests for hearings for the 1994 calendar year. 6
In this article I will first attempt to delineate the specific
nature of the dilemma faced by the social security practitioner
against the unique background of social security law and
practice. Second, I will endeavor to identify the pertinent
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Professional Conduct as well as the ambiguities within
both the Code and the Rules in the social security context.
Third, I will attempt to relate and analyze the few formal and
informal opinions from various state and local bars on the
subject. Fourth, I will examine arguably related court decisions
from other areas of the law, such as patent law. Fifth, I will
posit some tentative answers to the issues involved under the
Model Rules. Sixth, I will address the new amendment to the
Social Security Act regarding fraudulent claims and its
potential impact. Next, I will suggest that, pending clarification
from the courts or the bar or the Social Security
Administration, the zealous practitioner will best serve her
clientele by full disclosure of relevant "medical facts." Finally, I

12. See discussion infra part IV.
13. Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-296, § 206, 108 Stat. 1464, 1509-16 (1994).
14. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971).
15. Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106 (1984) (citing U.S. DEP'r OF HEALTH
AND HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS 1,
16 (May 1983)).
16. Social Security Administration, Process Reengineering Program; Disability
Reengineering Project Proposal, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,188 (1994) [hereinafter SSA Project

Proposal].
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will suggest the urgent necessity for creation of a regulatory
framework, either by the Social Security Administration or by
the state bars, or both, to deal with these problems.
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SECURITY LAW AND
PRACTICE

Congress has created two major federal income
maintenance programs administered by the Social Security
Administration: Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits
(SSDIB) under Title H of the Social Security Act 7 and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Benefits under Title XVI
of the Social Security Act."8 Although the financial criteria for
benefits under these programs are different, the basic
definition of disability is essentially the same. As statutorily
defined, "disability" means "inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months." 9
In other words, unlike, for example, the Veterans
Disability Benefits System, social security is an all-or-nothing
system. For social security purposes, either a person is
completely disabled, and thus meets the medical eligibility
criteria, or is not disabled. By comparison, veterans seeking
benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs may be found
disabled to a greater or lesser degree 20under very specific rules
setting forth percentages of disability.
The all-or-nothing nature of the social security system
vastly magnifies the potential adverse consequences to the
claimant of even a single medical document suggesting
malingering, exaggeration, non-compliance with medical care,
or simply a dispute over medical findings. There is no way for
the adjudicator or court to "split the difference." By contrast, in
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-:1399 (1988). For more detail regarding these programs,
see Richard P. Weishaupt & Robert E. Rains, Sullivan v. Zebley: New Disability
Standards for Indigent Children to Obtain Government Benefits, 35 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 539, 540-46 (1991).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)1(XA) (1988). This section is applicable to SSI claims
through 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(aX3) (1988). For a modified definition for disability
based on blindness, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(B) (1988).
20. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1131, 1134 (Supp. I1 1991).

ADVERSE MEDICAL EVIDENCE

103

V.A. cases (or, by way of another example, workers'
compensation cases) 2 ' the adjudicator faced with contradictory
medical information may well determine that the claimant is
forty or sixty percent disabled, but not one hundred percent;
the claimant will then receive some benefits.22 That option is
not available within the social security system, and thus one
adverse piece of medical information may lead to a total denial
of benefits in the social security system whereas it would not in
other legal contexts.
The claimant seeking disability benefits is confronted with
a four-step administrative procedure, theoretically designed for
the careful and rigorous assessment of her medical condition,
but in reality notorious for its intrinsic delays. 3 Briefly, the
original application, although made at the local Social Security
District Office, is actually examined by a state agency (or
Bureau of Disability Determination or DDS) acting under
It is
contract to the Social Security Administration.'
noteworthy that the applicant, as part of the application
process, is required to execute medical release forms.2" If the
applicant is denied a favorable decision at this initial
determination stage, the applicant may apply for
"reconsideration."" Again, while this reconsideration request
is made at the local Social Security District Office, the
reconsideration is also determined by the state agency rather
than the Social Security Administration. It is quite common
for claimants to go through the initial determination and
reconsideration levels pro se without benefit of legal counsel.28
If the applicant receives an unfavorable decision at the
reconsideration level, she has sixty days in which to request a
hearing before an administrative law judge of the Social

21. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 512, 513 (1991).
22. See supra notes 20-21.
23. For more detail regarding this administrative procedure, see Robert E.
Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security? 15 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1987). For
the Supreme Court's response to the delays, see Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104,

110-11 (1984).
24. See SSA Project Proposal, supra note 16, at 18,188, 18,190, 18,191 (for a
flowchart of the process); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.601-.641, 404.900-.906, 416.301.335, 416.1001-.1018, 416.1401-.1405 (1994).
25. Form SSA-827; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512-.1516, 416.912-.916 (1994).
26. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907-.922, 416.1406-.1422 (1994).
27. Id.; see also SSA Project Proposal, supra note 16, at 18,192.
28. See SSA Project Proposal, supra note 16, at 18,189.
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Security Administration.29 This third administrative level is,
in reality, the first time that the claim will be heard by an
entity of the Social Security Administration. 3 For many
claimants, it is a critical part of the adjudicatory process and
one in which claimants increasingly are represented by
counsel.3 ' Not surprisingly, it is at this level that the
claimant's representative will most frequently be confronted by
the ethical dilemma of identification or possession of
contradictory, if not outright adverse, medical evidence.
The final administrative determination level is the Social
Security Appeals Couacil. 2 If the claimant is denied benefits
at the ALJ level, she has sixty days to seek review of the AU's
decision by the Appeals Council.33 Additionally, the Appeals
Council may reopen a favorable AUJ decision on its own
motion. 4 Unless the Appeals Council remands the case for
further administrative proceedings, the Appeals Council
decision constitutes the final decision of the Secretary of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) with regard to the individual's claim for benefits.3
Should that determination be adverse, the claimant then has
sixty days in which to seek judicial review by filing a complaint
in federal district court against the Secretary."

29. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.933, 416.1433 (1994).
30. Id. § 404.944 to .953, 416.1444 to .1453.
31. See SSA Project Proposal, supra note 16, at 18,195.
32. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 416.1467 (1994).
33. Id. §§ 404.968, 416.1468.
34. Id. §§ 404.969, 416.1469.
35. Id. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. Frequently, the action of the Appeals Council
takes the format of adopting the decision of the Administrative Law Judge as the
final decision of the Secretary. See, e.g., Ventura v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1226,
1228 (D. Del. 1994).
On Aug. 15, 1994, President Clinton signed the Social Security Independence
and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464
(1994), which made the Social Security Administration an independent agency as of
March 31, 1995. Throughout this article, I have referred to the "Secretary" of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services as the titular head of
the Social Security Administration and as the defendant in federal court. Under
the provisions of this Act, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
is now the titular head of the Social Security Administration and the proper
defendant in federal court. I have retained all references to the Secretary because,
until this time, it has been the Secretary who has been ultimately responsible and
who has been named as defendant.
36. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)
(1988).
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The nature of the available judicial review magnifies, once
again, the potential adverse consequences to the claimant of
admission into evidence of a potentially adverse medical report.
The Social Security Act does not allow the courts to conduct a
de novo review of the record. Rather, judicial review is limited
to determining whether the final decision of the Secretary is
supported by substantial evidence. 7 Substantial evidence has
been described as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."38 Thus, even though a
reviewing court concludes that the weight or preponderance of
the evidence indicates that the claimant is disabled, the court
theoretically should deny benefits if there is substantial
evidence contradicting that conclusion. 9 It is quite possible
that one adverse medical report could constitute such
substantial evidence and prove fatal to the claim.4" Even if
the reviewing court reverses the denial of benefits, the
claimant will have been forced to wait a very considerable
period of time for critically needed income.4
III. PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

At the time of this writing, a majority of states have
adopted some version of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 2 Twelve states, however, continue to adhere to some

37. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988).

38. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
39. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "However, substantial evidence is less than
the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding
from being supported by substantial evidence." Cunning v. Harris, 505 F. Supp. 16,
17 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
40. "'Substantial' evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a
preponderance of the evidence. It must do more than create a suspicion of the
existence of the fact to be established, but 'no substantial evidence' can be found
only when there is a 'conspicuous absence of credible choices' or 'no contrary
medical evidence.'" Shannon v. Califano, 485 F. Supp. 939, 940 (NJD. Tex. 1980)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Not all courts take such a rigid position. See
Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1986).
41. For an idea of a disabled person's dire need for federal benefits, see
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 350 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 430-31 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. See SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND STANDARDS
PROFESSION 231-32 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 1993).

ON

THE

LEGAL
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form of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.43 Both
the Rules and the Code have provisions which relate in some
way to assiduous representation, client confidentiality and the
scope of an advocate's duty to identify and produce adverse
evidence.
Under the Model Code, Canon 7 provides that "A lawyer
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the
law."44 The Model Rules require "diligence" rather than
zealousness per se. Rule 1.3 states, "A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client."45 The ABA comment states, "A lawyer should act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."46
Both the Code and the Rules dictate the preservation of
the confidentiality of information obtained from or about
clients. Canon 4 of the ABA Model Code states, "A lawyer
should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."47 The
prohibition on revealing "secrets" is particularly important in
this context. DR 4-101(A) states that a "'secret' refers to other
information gained in the professional relationship that the
client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to
the client."48 Typically an adverse medical report would fall
within this definition of "secret."
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain a similar,
but not identical, provision. Rule 1.6(a) provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except
for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation .... ,'
Neither the dictate of confidentiality, however, nor that of
diligence/zealousness is absolute. Under DR 4-101(C)(2), "A
lawyer may reveal ... [c]onfidences or secrets when permitted

43. Id. See also AMERICAN BAR ASS N & THE BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF.,
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:301 (1991) [hereinafter
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT].
44. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY Canon 7 (1983).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1993)
46. Id.
47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4.
48. Id. DR 4-101.
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a).
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under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.""
Ethical Consideration 7-27 mandates that, 'Because it
interferes with the proper administration of justice, a lawyer
should not suppress evidence that he or his client has a legal
obligation to reveal or produce."5 Likewise, DR 7-102(A)(3)
mandates, "In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall
not:... (3) [clonceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he
is required by law to reveal."5 2 Nor may a lawyer "[clounsel or
assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal
or fraudulent."5 3
Under the Model Rules, there are several provisions
limiting zealousness and confidentiality. Rule 8.4(c) declares
that it is professional misconduct to "engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."'
Likewise, Rule 1.2(d) prohibits assisting or counseling a client
to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent.5 Rule 4.1(b) mandates that a lawyer shall not
knowingly "fail to disclose a material fact to a third person
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by
rule 1.6. "56
The provision of the Model Rules most pertinent to the
social security advocate's dilemma is Rule 3.3, "Candor Toward
the Tribunal."57 The "Legal Background" to Rule 3.3 clearly
anticipates that a tribunal can be either a judicial or an
administrative proceeding:
Rule 3.3 imposes a duty of candor on a lawyer appearing
before a tribunal in a court of law or adjudicative proceeding.
While the term "tribunal" is not defined in the [tlerminology
section of the Rules, or in Rule 3.3 or its Comment, the
context in which the term is used in the Rules makes it clear
that "tribunal" refers to a trial-type proceeding in which
witnesses are questioned, evidence is presented, the parties
and their counsel participate fully, and the decision is
rendered by a fact finder.5"
50.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101.

51. Id. EC 7-27.
52. Id. DR 7-102.

53. I&
54.

MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c).

55. Id. Rule 1.2(d).

56. Id. Rule 4.1(b).
57. Id. Rule 3.3.
58.

ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 334 (Jeanne P. Gray ed.,
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Against this legal background, it is difficult to argue that an
ALJ proceeding is not a proceeding before a tribunal.
Rule 3.3(a)(2) states that a "[1lawyer shall not
knowingly... fail to clisclose a material fact to a tribunal when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by the client."59 In an ex parte proceeding the
standard is even higher. Rule 3.3(d) mandates, "In an ex parte
proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material
facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to
make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are
adverse." ° Unfortunately, the term "ex parte proceeding" is
not defined either in this section or in the terminology section
of the Model Rules.6 1 The official Comment to the Model Rules

provides the following explanation of "ex parte proceedings:"
Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of
presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should
consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is
expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in
an ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary
restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by
opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is
nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has
an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just
consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the

correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known
to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are
necessary to an informed decision."
The key question then is whether a social security hearing
is an ex parte proceeding within the meaning of the Model
Rules. To address this question, it is necessary to take a more
detailed look at Social Security Administrative Law Judge
hearings.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the
nature of social security hearings in detail only once, in
63 In some ways, the case is as
Richardson v. Perales.
significant for what it did not hold as for what it did hold. The

2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
59. Id. at 329.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 11.
62. Id. at 332.
63. 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971).
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Court declined to determine how or whether social security
hearings fit within the Federal Administrative Procedures Act:
'We need not decide whether the APA has general application
to social security disability claims, for the social security
administrative procedure does not vary from that prescribed by
the APA."64 The Court opined that "the agency operates
essentially, and is intended so to do, as an adjudicator and not
as an advocate or adversary."65 This language has given rise
to the oft-quoted doctrine that social security hearings are
"nonadversarial" in nature.6
In Perales, the claimant challenged the fairness of the
hearing procedures, inter alia,on due process grounds:
He says that the hearing examiner has the responsibility for
gathering the evidence and "to make the Government's case
as strong as possible"; that naturally he leans toward a
decision in favor of the evidence he has gathered; that justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice, citing Offutt v. United
States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954), and In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955); and that an "independent hearing examiner
such as in the" Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act should be provided.6'
The Court rejected this assertion:
Neither are we persuaded by the advocate-judge-multiple-hat
suggestion. It assumes too much and would bring down too
many procedures designed, and working well, for a
governmental structure of great and growing complexity. The
social security hearing examiner, furthermore, does not act as
counsel. He acts as an examiner charged with developing the
facts."
But, while the Court has upheld the role of the Social Security
ALJ, unquestionably the ALls position in a social security
hearing is significantly different from that of a trial judge in a
temporary restraining order (TRO) proceeding. The ALJ is an
employee of the federal entity from whom the claimant is

64. Id. at 409.
65. Id. at 403.
66. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 891 (1989).
67. Perales, 402 U.S. at 408-09. Social Security Administration hearings are
now presided over by administrative law judges, not hearing examiners. See
Hudson, 490 U.S. at 879.
68. Perales, 402 U.S. at 410.
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seeking a monetary award.69 The ALJ's employer will be the
defendant in federal court should the claimant be denied
benefits administratively and file a complaint for judicial
review.7" Not only is the AUJ technically an employee of this
potentially interested inchoate party, but HHS's employeremployee relationship with the AUJs is an unusual one in a
judicial context.7
For example, if one were to sue an executive entity of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the appropriate state court
(usually the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania), one would
understand that the presiding judiciary would be employees of
the Commonwealth, albeit of an entirely independent branch of
state government with. a set salary and fixed term of office. In
contrast, the AUJ is not only employed by the same department
as SSA, but-despite protestations of independence-is
somewhat controlled by purportedly higher authority within
that department. This effort at control is nowhere clearer than
in the context of acquiescence/nonacquiescence in decisions of
the circuit courts of appeal. There is a long and unfortunate
history of SSA taking the position that it is not bound by
precedential decisions of the circuit courts, sometimes even
within the circuit that issued the decision, and regardless of
whether the Secretary had sought a writ of certiorari from the
Supreme Court to review the case. SSA now publishes
"Acquiescence Rulings" indicating which circuit court decisions
it will abide by and within which circuit(s)-if not
nationally-it will abide by a ruling.72 Recently, the Office of
Hearings and Appeals (OHA) Associate Commissioner sent a
memorandum to all AUJs directing them that they may not
rely upon, or use as authority, a circuit court decision that
would be favorable to a claimant if SSA has not "acquiesced" in
that decision, even if the claimant's case is being heard within

69. There have been repeated attempts to create an independent AUJ corps.
On Nov. 19, 1993, the Senate passed S. 486, which would place all AU's in a
unified corps. See Senate Passes Measure Creating Independent ALJ Corps, SOC.
SECURITY F., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 1, 4.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). See also Recent Congressional Attention on
Independent Agency, SSA's Backlog of Disability Reviews, and Quality of Notices,
Soc. SECURITY F., Mar. 1994, at 1, 7.
71. See Rains, supra ncte 23, at 12-13. At times that relationship has been
stormy. During the era of "Bellmon Reviews" in the early 1980s, the Association of
Administrative Law Judges sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services and
high SSA officials alleging illegal interference with their independence.
72. Id. at 8-10; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.985, 416.1485 (1994).
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that circuit!"3 One would hardly expect a court administrator
to purport to instruct trial court judges which appellate
decisions they are allowed to utilize, much less expect that any
trial judge would feel bound by such an instruction. This would
be all the more remarkable in a lawsuit in which the court
administrator was a party in interest.
The ALJ is different from the trial judge hearing a TRO in
another important respect. A TRO is typically presented with
little advance warning to a neutral judge who has little, if any,
ability to discover underlying information. 4 By comparison,
the current national average is for the AUJ hearing process to
take 265 days." Even if one assumed a two-month delay from
the date of the hearing until the issuance of the decision, the
case would be before the OHA for some 200 days before the
ALJ hearing. After the case is assigned to an individual AIJ,
the ALJ receives a significant record already compiled by the
state agency."6 She is hardly the tabula rasa we expect of a
trial judge hearing a TRO. Moreover, the ALT has an
independent duty to develop the case," and extraordinary
discovery tools for doing so. The claimant is supposed to submit
evidence in advance of the hearing, if possible." The AU can
require a claimant to submit to one or more "consultative
[medical] evaluations" from her own doctor or one under
contract to the state agency." The AUJ can, and often does,
contact claimants' counsel prior to a hearing and request or
demand additional medical records which she perceives to be

73. No Application of Circuit Caselaw Without an Acquiescence Ruling, SOC.
SECURITY F., Mar. 1994, at 12-13. This raises an interesting question: could an
ALJ, who theoretically is guaranteed quasi-judicial independence, be disciplined in
some fashion by the SSA for citing and using a circuit court opinion in a decision
to make a ruling favorable to a claimant?
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b); Fengler v. Numismatic Americana, Inc., 832
F.2d 745, 747 (2d Cir. 1987).
75. See SSA Project Proposal, supra note 16, at 18,195.
76. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d), 416.912(d) (1994).
77. "'The ALJ's duties are heightened when a claimant is pro se, but exist
even when a claimant is represented by counsel.'" Fishburn v. Sullivan, 802 F.
Supp. 1018, 1025-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Walker v. Heckler, 588 F. Supp. 819,
824 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)). "The fact that a claimant is represented by counsel does not

absolve the ALJ from his abiding responsibility to develop fully the facts of the
claimant's case in a nonadversarial fashion consistent with the broadly remedial
purposes of the Social Security Act." Id. at 1026 (quoting Masella v. Heckler, 592
F. Supp. 621, 624 (W.D.N.Y. 1984)).
78. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.935, 416.1435 (1994).
79. Id. §§ 404.1517, 416.917.
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lacking.8" The AUJ may also direct the attendance and
testimony of expert witnesses-vocational experts and, less
frequently, medical experts-at hearings."' The ALJ may
issue subpoenas on her own initiative to other witnesses to
appear and testify.

2

If the ALJ is dissatisfied with the

completeness of the record at the close of the hearing, she may
use any or all of these discovery tools after the hearing and
convene a subsequent hearing or hearings as she deems fit.83
Given the duty of the A.J to develop the record fully, and
the means available for doing so, it is debatable whether there
is an unrepresented interested party at an ALJ hearing as
there is in the classic ex parte proceeding. (It is true that the
Social Security Administration does not have counsel present
at the hearing to present a case against the claimant. An
experiment with such a government representative program in
the 1980s was abandoned in the face of much criticism.)' 4
While undoubtedly the Social Security Administration is an
inchoate party, in the many ways set forth above, the ALJ, and
the OHA staff, actively ensure the fullness of the record. ALJs
have the ability, indeed the duty, to avoid the intrinsic danger
of an ex parte hearing, that critical information favorable to
the absent party will be kept from the tribunal. Presumably
this danger is the key concern behind Model Rule 3.3(d).
Finally, yet another critical distinction exists between a
social security hearing and an application for a TRO. In the
typical TRO proceeding there is great pressure on the court to
issue an immediate decision to avert immediate irreparable
harm (or to deny the request).8" By comparison, although
claimants are entitled to a prompt decision and are often in
dire need of the benefits they are seeking, no time limit is
imposed on the ALJ for issuing a decision even after the long-

80. Presumably this authority is based upon 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(c),
404.1710, 416.912(c), 416.1510 (1994).
81. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1971).
82. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950(d), 416.1450(d) (1994).
83. Id. §§ 404.944, 416.1444. In recent years, however, some ALJs have
complained that an SSA managerial decision to take away their authority over
OHA support staff has prevanted them from adequately developing cases. See
Christine M. Moore, SSA Disability Adjudication in Crisis!, JUDGES' J., Summer
1994, at 2, 40-42.
84. Unconstitutional: Government Representative Program Enjoined, SOC.
SEcURITY F., July 1986, at 2-5; Government Representative Project Discontinued,
Soc. SEcuRrrY F., Apr. 1987, at 1, 1.
85. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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awaited hearing. 6 There is little, if any, danger of the ALJ
being rushed into a hurried decision based on an incomplete
record, as social security's own statistics demonstrate.8 7
In short, in many ways social security hearings are truly
sui generis.
IV.

STATE AND LOCAL

BAR INTERPRETATIONS

As noted, the bars in a few states have grappled with the
quandary of the advocate's duty in this context. The resulting
opinions vary in degree of formality, depth of analysis, and
ultimate conclusion.
A. Alabama
In a brief opinion published in July 1993, the General
Counsel of the Alabama State Bar Disciplinary Commission
unequivocally held that "Rule 3.3(d) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Alabama State Bar applies to lawyers participating in hearings before a Social Security Administrative Law
Judge adjudicating social security disability, retirement and
survivor claims."" In reaching this conclusion, the General
Counsel relied upon Professors Hazard and Hodes' handbook,
The Modern Rules of Professional Conduct, and its general
discussion of ex parte proceedings (which does not address
social security proceedings), as well as one patent case." s
B. Missouri
In 1989, a private practitioner in Missouri requested an
opinion from the Missouri Bar Ethics Committee as to whether
he was under a duty to disclose to a Social Security AUJ depositions in his possession which were taken in civil litigation
prior to the filing of his client's disability claim. The attorney
stated that in his opinion, "some would be helpful in her social
security case, some would not matter one way or another, and

86. Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106, 116-17 (1984).
87. See SSA Project Proposal, supra note 16, at 18,195; text accompanying
note 75.
88. Robert W. Norris, Opinions of the General Counsel, 54 ALA. LAW. 252, 252
(1993).
89. Id. at 252-53 (citing Pfizer and Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 401
F.2d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969)).
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a few would be harmful."" The General Chairman of the Missouri Bar Administration Advisory Committee responded:
It is the opinion of the Advisory Committee that a lawyer
has no duty to defeat his own case. While it would be an
ethical violation to violate the provisions of Rule 3.3 of (sic)
Rule 4, we do not believe the duty exists to present every
shred of evidence known supporting every or all positions
possible in litigation.91
No further explanation, rationale or authority was provided in
the opinion.
C. New York County
In 1993, the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New
York County Lawyers Association was presented with the question of whether a lawyer representing claimants seeking social
security benefits "is obliged to produce all relevant medical
information about the claimant in this process, including information obtained from the clients which may be detrimental to
the clients' claims, if'
no request is made for the information."92
The committee addressed this issue under New York
State's Code of Professional Responsibility which is in fact a
hybrid of the Model Code and the Model Rules.93 In a wellreasoned opinion, the committee made a number of points. It
began by noting the potential conflict between a lawyer's duty
under Canon 4 to preserve client confidences and secrets and
the lawyer's duty under Canon 7 to represent a client zealously
within the bounds of the law. "Whether these interests collide
in the circumstances presented depends on whether the disclosure of medical information is necessary to avoid the lawyer's
presentation of a false claim for disability benefits."94
The committee's opinion disclaimed any reliance upon the
Social Security Act and SSA regulations. The opinion addressed

90. Letter from Dewey L. Crepeau, Partner, Crepeau & Roberts, to Harold
Barrick, Missouri Bar Ethics Committee 1 (April 7, 1989) (on file with author).
91. Letter from Harold W. Barrick, General Chairman, Missouri Bar Administration, to Dewey L. Crepeau, Partner, Crepeau & Roberts 1 (April 19, 1989) (on
file with author).
92. Comm. on Prof. Ethics of the N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, New York
County Lawyers' Ethics Opinion, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 9, 1993, at 2.
93. MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 43, at 01:38-01:40.
94. New York County Lawyers' Ethics Opinion, supra note 92, at 2.
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solely the lawyer's obligation under New York State's Code.
The opinion noted, however, that "a lawyer must comply with
the letter and the spirit of any statutes and regulations governing disclosure in proceedings for social security benefits."95
Having made that disclaimer, the committee opined,
If no law independently mandates disclosure, then nothing in
the Code requires a lawyer to volunteer evidence-even evidence relevant to the matter in issue-to a tribunal or other
person before whom the lawyer appears on behalf of a client.
A lawyer's obligation is to present whatever evidence exists
which, in the lawyer's professional judgment, best advances
the client's interests in the proceeding. That the lawyer may
have been given access by the client to other evidence that
does not support the client's position does not alter this obligation. To the contrary, if such other evidence is provided by,
or upon instructions from, the client, the lawyer may have a
duty not to disclose such evidence.96
The opinion went on, however, to add several important
caveats. First, the opinion noted:
A lawyer need not volunteer relevant evidence harmful to a
client's interests, but neither may a lawyer knowingly make a
false statement of fact, use peijured testimony or false evidence, or assist a client in fraudulent conduct. DR 7102(A)(4), (5) & (7). If a lawyer is able to advance a good faith
claim for benefits despite knowledge of contrary medical reports, and if none of the evidence or statements made in support of that claim is known to be false in light of such knowledge, then nothing in the Code precludes assertion of the
claim. If,however, the lawyer's knowledge of the adverse
medical information constitutes knowledge that the claim
itself is false, then the lawyer is not free to advance the claim
and must withdraw from the representation.97
Also, the opinion addressed situations where a doctor has
issued two opinions with regard to a client which could appear
to be contradictory. In the first situation, the doctor's opinion
used language which has a technical meaning within the social
security regulations, the attorney went back to the doctor and
asked whether the doctor had intended that technical meaning,

95. Id.
96. Id.

97. Id.
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and the doctor issued a second opinion which was intended to
clarify and revise the first. Based upon these facts and circumstances, the lawyer would have no reason to believe that the
doctor's intention in issuing the second opinion was anything
other than to correct an unintentional error in the first report.
In that case it would be appropriate for the lawyer to submit
only the second opinion.98
The committee compared that situation to another scenario
where a second report from a medical treating source conflicts
with a first report and clearly is intended to rescind that prior
report. In that scenario, the committee opined:
the lawyer could not reasonably rely on the first report as a
basis for proceeding with the claim. In that circumstance, the
lawyer would not be free to offer only the first opinion as evidence, for to do so would be to present evidence that the lawyer knows to be untrue.99
Finally the opinion noted, 'There are also circumstances
when the lawyer either must produce both medical opinions or
may produce neither opinion, even if the opinions are not contradictory. Truth cannot be measured in a vacuum."' 0
The committee concluded that "[s]ubject to the qualifications set forth above, a lawyer representing a claimant in a
social security disability hearing is not obligated to produce all
relevant medical information if no request is made for such
information and such information does not constitute knowledge that the claim is false."1 '
D. Virginia
In 1992, a Social Security Administrative Law Judge
lodged a complaint with the Virginia State Bar asserting that a
private attorney was in direct violation of Virginia DR 7105(A), in refusing to comply with an order which the AJ had
issued directing the attorney to "submit any and all documentation in his possession pertaining to [a] claimant's alleged
physical and mental impairments ... so that a determination
can be made as to whether said documentation is material to
the case." 1' The attorney had previously written to this ALJ
98. Id.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The Court's Order of April 9, 1992, directing claimant's counsel to submit
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stating the position of his firm that it would comply with any
request for "[any specific medical record generated in the normal course of health care delivery... [and] [a]ny report from a
doctor addressing topics you specify.""°3 The attorney went on
to state, "Except as noted above, we will not state whether or
not we have supplied all medical evidence and we will not
supply medical evidence which undermines a claimant's
claim.""° In support of this position, the attorney relied upon
social security regulations and sub-regulatory material. The
regulation states, "If you do not give us the medical and other
evidence that we need and request, we will have to make a
decision based on information available in your case."' A
sub-regulatory document, HALLEX § 1-2-524, mandates that
"[a] claimant's failure or refusal to submit existing evidence
that an AIJ needs and request [sic] is not a basis for denying
O6 Rather, the ALJ
the claim or dismissing the RH.'
must
make a decision based on the evidence available in the
case." ' 7 The attorney also expressed the concern that the
judge's order would place a claimant represented by counsel at
a comparative disadvantage to a pro se claimant.' 8 This is
because an aggressive and conscientious attorney will usually
obtain more documents than the typical pro se claimant. Some
of those documents could come back to haunt the claimant.
Finally, the attorney pointed out the AL's authority to subpoena specific records and to obtain consultative examinations.'0 9
In a thoughtful letter opinion, the Assistant Bar Counsel of
the Virginia State Bar informed the ALT that the attorney's
actions did not constitute misconduct under Virginia Disciplinary Rule 7-105 and that the state bar would take no further
action in the matter."0 It is noteworthy, however, that the
Virginia State Bar opinion does not purport to decide the ulti-

evidence (on file with author).
103. Letter from Charles H. Cuthbert, Jr., Partner, Cuthbert Law Offices, P.C.,
to an Administrative Law Judge, Social Security Administration 1 (Mar. 26, 1992)
(on file with author).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1516 (1994)) (emphasis omitted).
106. "RITI refers to a Request for a Hearing.
107. SSA HALLEX § 1-2-524 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 404.1516, 416.916).
108. Letter from Charles H. Cuthbert, Jr., supra note 103, at 1.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Letter from Richard C. Vorhis, Assistant Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar,
to an Administrative Law Judge, Social Security Administration (Aug. 18, 1992) (on
file with author).
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mate issue of the attorney's obligation to produce the documents. The opinion cited Virginia Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A),
which states, "a lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client
to disregard ...

a ruling of a tribunal made in the course for

[sic] proceeding, but .he may take appropriate steps in good
faith to test the validity of such rule or ruling."" The Bar
Counsel noted that the relevant question therefore is whether
the attorney was taking appropriate steps in good faith to test
the validity of such a ruling."
The Bar Counsel then noted the attorney's dilemma. Under
Canon 4 the attorney is required to preserve the client's confidences and secrets.
The dilemma is particularly harsh in that if [the attorney]
should reveal the secrets of his client, he would likely be
facing a misconduct proceeding on the violation of the rules
regarding confidences and secrets. Furthermore, he would be
placed in the situation of not being able to validly contest the
ruling since once the information is disclosed, the effect cannot be retracted even on appeal, and therefore would be likely
considered moot."3
The opinion concluded:
Since there is no final order in any of the proceedings effected
[sic] that [the attorney] could legally pursue on appeal, [the
attorney] would appear to be proceeding in the only way that
he presently can to take appropriate steps in good faith to
test the validity of your ruling."'
Under the circumstances, the Virginia Bar Counsel found that
"whether or not [the attorney] is legally correct in his reading
of the applicable laws concerning these proceedings, his actions
do not
constitute misconduct in regard to Disciplinary Rule 7" 1
105.

111. Id. at 2 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7106(A)).
112. Id.
113. Id at 2.
114. Id.

115. Id. at 3.
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E.

West Virginia

A variation of the same issues arose in West Virginia in
1991, which ultimately involved higher officials within the
Social Security Administration. The acting Hearing Office Chief
Administrative Law Judge of the Charleston OHA had proposed a standard "Pre-Hearing Order" to be issued to representatives upon receipt of a request for hearing and prior to assignment of the case to an individual A.J.116 Claimants' representatives took exception to paragraph 3 of the proposed PreHearing Order which would have required the representative
to submit the following:
All relevant medical evidence as set forth in 20 C.F.R.
404.1513/416.913, including medical work-related assessments
and updated clinical records from treating physicians, when
the same can reasonably be produced. If a representative
knows that available evidence exists which is material to the
issue of disability, the representative shall submit such evidence to the Administrative Law Judge who adjudicates the
case, unless the representative identifies good cause for not
submitting the specific evidence and timely petitions the
Administrative Law Judge in writing."'
Several members of the Charleston Bar who represent
social security claimants signed a letter to the Charleston Acting Chief ALJ in November 1991 setting forth their objections
to this proposed language."' The attorneys forcefully articulated the position that they "have an obligation to present evidence which is in the best interests of our client and which
proves the existence of an impairment and his (her) resulting
disability. We are not charged with the duty, obligation or responsibility to disprove disability." 119
They then proposed that the West Virginia State Bar adopt
a resolution in opposition to a lawyer having a duty to submit
adverse evidence in a social security proceeding.120 Following

116. [Proposed] Pre-Hearing Order issued by Charleston, West Virginia, Office
of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration (on file with the author).
117. Id at 2.
118. Letter from Frederick G. Barkus, et al., Partner, Bickley, Jacobs &
Barkus, to Charlie Paul Andrus, Acting Chief Administrative Law Judge, Charleston, West Virginia, Office of Hearings and Appeals (Nov. 7, 1991) (on file with
author).
119. Id. at 2.
120. Id.
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a number of meetings, the Acting Chief Administrative Law
Judge for the United States issued a memorandum to the incoming Charleston Hearing Office Chief Administrative Law
Judge, addressing various issues raised in the controversy. 21
This memorandum expressed a number of concerns with regard
to the formality of the proposed Pre-Hearing Order, delays in
scheduling hearings that it would cause, and the proposed requirement of submitting evidence in advance of hearings."
Addressing the issue of an attorney's duty to produce adverse evidence and the proposed West Virginia State Bar Resolution, the Acting Chief ALJ for the United States stated his
opposition to the principle that an attorney does not have a
duty to submit such evidence. He cited a number of reasons.
First, the U.S. Acting Chief noted that "the ALJ as fact finder
is not asking the attorney to divulge any information that the
Judge is not already entitled to."" He added, "I note that it
has been a long-standing maxim of evidence law that the refusal or failure to bring before the tribunal a document whose
contents are material or relevant to the issues of the case permits the tribunal to infer that the tenor of the document is
unfavorable to the party's cause."" Furthermore, "[a]
representative's refusal to submit material medical evidence to
an ALJ also cannot be reconciled with Rule 3.3 of the American
Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct."'2
The memorandum opined that "[tihe Social Security disability
hearing is analogous to an ex parte proceeding, in that the
hearing is nonadversarial in nature, i.e., the Agency is not
represented." 26
Importantly, however, the U.S. Acting Chief Judge was
careful to add, "my beliefs are based on an initial review and
analysis of pertinent law and policy." 2 ' He noted that he had
also discovered "at least one agency policy statement (which is
somewhat dated) which suggests a contrary conclusion."'2 He

121. U.S. A.J Memorandum, supra note 10.
122. Id.
123. Id at 3.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing rule 3.3(d) relating to ex parte proceedings and adverse facts).
126. Id. at 3-4.
127. Id. at 4. Presumably, this is a reference to HALLEX § 1-2-524, cited by
the Virginia attorney in his response to the ALJ. See supra notes 103-109 and
accompanying text.
128. Id.
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stated that he was going "to request the Associate Commissioner to request an opinion of the Office of General Counsel on the
issue.""
Notwithstanding the U.S. Acting Chief Judge's reservations, the West Virginia State Bar Board of Governors finally
approved a resolution in April 1992 formally opposing that
portion of paragraph 3 of the proposed hearing order,
which purports to require claimant's [sic] attorneys or representatives to obtain and submit evidence which may be adverse to their respective clients' interests. The State Bar is of
the opinion that such a requirement is contrary to the obligation of the claimant's attorney to zealously represent his or
her client and tends to denigrate the advocacy role and convert the attorney into an arm of the administration.13
V.

COURT DECISIONS ON Ex PARTE PROCEEDINGS AND
ADVERSE EVIDENCE

There appears to be a complete lack of judicial precedent
on the key issue addressed in this article, the duty of an attorney in a social security proceeding to produce evidence which is
adverse to his client's claim of disability. Thus far, this has
been a classic example of a legal question capable of repetition
yet evading review. None of the various state opinions on the
subject cite any judicial authority within the social security
area. The Annotated Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct of the
Center of Professional Responsibility of the ABA, in its explanation of paragraph (d) of Rule 3.3, cites a number of cases on
ex parte proceedings and adverse evidence, none of which arise
in the social security field."' Similarly, The Law of Lawyering,A Handbook on the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, in
its discussion of the duty of disclosure in ex parte proceedings
makes no reference to social security proceedings or cases at
all. "32
' There is no authority which indicates that Rule 3.3.(d)
was intended to apply to a social security administrative proceeding, or that the drafters of the Model Rules even contemId.
130. Resolution of the West Virginia State Bar (Apr. 23, 1992) (on file with
author).
129.

131. MODEL RULES, supra note 58, at 347.
132. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAzAR), JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 579-80, 619

(2d ed. Supp. 1992).
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plated the application of Rule 3.3(d) to social security proceedings."a Obviously, this does not answer the question as to
whether Rule 3.3(d) logically should be applied to social security proceedings.
The various cases cited by the authorities and commentators in support of Rule 3.3(d) fall into several categories. There
are several cases involving motions for default judgment where
critical information was kept from the court, situations involving nonmeritorious claims to a court, situations where there
has been concealment. in discovery, and others involving concealment of matters relating to fee arrangements with clients.
The most frequently cited are patent cases. All of these cases
arguably have some bearing on social security practice, but all
likewise are markedly distinct from social security practice.
The Annotated Model Rules cites the following cases in its
Legal Background for Rule 3.3(d).
In Addison v. Brown," an attorney filed a writ to prohibit a trial on behalf of criminal defendants alleging a violation of Florida's speedy trial rule. The writ was filed late on a
Friday afternoon, and the trial was supposed to commence the
following Monday. Despite the inconvenience, the court ordered
a stay and therefore the trial was postponed. Subsequently, the
court found out that the petition for the writ omitted critical
information which counsel knew or should have known: the
petitioners had obtained three or more continuances and "had
specifically waived speedy trial under the rule."'35 The District Court of Appeals opined, 'While an attorney always carries a duty and obligation of candor with the court... this is
especially iinportant when the relief requested is urgently
sought and the time insufficient to allow the opposition to present a response."' 36 Under the circumstances, the District
Court of Appeals imposed sanctions against the attorney which
were upheld on appeal per curiam by the Florida Supreme
Court. Clearly, the exigencies of the situation, involving a last
minute writ to prohibit a criminal trial, are far more akin to a

133. A recent student note detailing the legislative history of Model Rule 3.3(d)
reaches the same conclusion sub silentio; there is no reference to social security
practice or caselaw in the deliberative processes leading to promulgation of the
Rule. Jill M. Dennis, Note, The Model Rules and the Search for Truth: The Origins
and Applications of Model Rule 3.3(d), 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 157 (1994).
134. 413 So. 2d 1240 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
135. Id. at 1241.
136. Id. (citations omitted).

ADVERSE MEDICAL EVIDENCE

123

typical TRO proceeding than to practice before a Social Securi-

ty AIT.
In re Rensch13' also arose in a criminal context. A criminal defendant had retained private counsel on a limited basis
and also sought the services of the public defender's office. This
caused the trial judge concern about the defendant's status as
an indigent and whether the defendant's assets would be available to satisfy a county lien for court appointed attorney's fees
before they would be available to pay private attorney fees. The
judge questioned the private attorney as to what his consideration had been thus far in representation, to which the attorney replied, "Not a penny."" While this might have been literally true, in that no cash had changed hands, what the attorney had failed to disclose was that he had had the criminal defendant deed to him a lot valued at $4,000-$5,000 and also give
a promissory note for $5,000 with the defendant's parents cosigning the note as sureties. 39 The state supreme court found
that the attorney was guilty of a serious breach of professional
ethics, and that he had willfully violated Canon 1 and Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) and (5) by his misrepresentation of his
fee arrangement to the court. 40 There can be little argument
that the attorney in this case had used an overly literal English usage to commit "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."'' Moreover, in this situation, the critical information
was largely within the control of the interested parties, and the
court had little independent mechanism for ascertaining the
falseness of the attorney's statements. This is unlike an ALJ
with broad discovery powers.
In re Turner'm involved a complex receivership matter
with two corporate entities and a private attorney who acted as
an independent counsel for one of those entities. During a recess in the receivership proceeding, the attorney accepted from
his employing corporation a check issued to that corporation
from a debtor corporation. After the recess, the trial judge

137. 333 N.W.2d 713 (SD. 1983).
138. Id. at 714.
139. Id. at 713-14.
140. Id at 716.
141. Id. (quoting Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4)). Unquestionably, a social security attorney who similarly misstated his fee arrangements to the Social Security
Administration would properly be subject to disciplinary proceedings. In re Quaid,
646 So.2d 343, 349 (La. 1994).
142. 416 A.2d 894 (N.J. 1980).
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placed the employing corporation in receivership. The attorney
subsequently deposited the check into his personal bank account even though he knew that the check was an asset of the
corporation then in receivership."' The New Jersey Supreme
Court found that the attorney had a duty to advise the Court of
this asset and, until being advised of the Court's disposition of
the receivership application, to hold the money in trust.'4
"Respondent's failure to do so constituted violations of DR 1102, as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and
of DR 7-102(A)(3), by failing to disclose that which he was required to reveal."14 The attorney was publicly reprimanded

and ordered to reimburse costs to the court.146 Again, this situation involved outright concealment of facts which the court
had no effective independent means of ascertaining at the time.
Furthermore, this was another situation involving an expedited
process where time was of the essence.
There are several cases involving default judgments and
the failure of the party seeking the default to inform the court
141
of understandings with opposing parties. In In re Schiff,
the attorney was found to have engaged in numerous bad acts.
Those which are most relevant to the duty to disclose involved
the attorney's repeated taking of default judgments when he
knew that opposing counsel had become involved in the case
and there was no intention on the part of defendants to default.
In some of these cases the attorney had told opposing counsel it
was not necessary to appear in court because he would obtain a
continuance or otherwise move the matter along, and then
proceeded to take a default. In several of these instances, the
attorney then failed to inform opposing counsel of the entry of
the default.'" The court imposed a public reprimand and two
years' probation. 49 These matters were, in reality, only ex
parte in the sense that, by the attorney's conduct, he made the
court unaware that the matters were being contested. They
were not true ex parte proceedings, but only appeared to be so
because of the attorney's ongoing pattern of deceit.

143. Id at 895.
144. Id.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 896.
542 S.W.2d 771 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
Id. at 771-74.
Id at 775.
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Similarly, in Hutton v. Fisher,5 ' a law firm took a default judgment in a personal injury matter despite the fact that
a senior attorney in the firm was aware that the defendants
were represented by counsel who asserted that he had telephoned the attorney requesting additional time to answer and
was assured that he might have whatever time he wanted. The
case is complicated by the fact that the new associate who took
the default judgment was apparently not made aware of the
contact from the counsel for the defendants. There was also
another unintentional error in counsel's averment in support of
the default in that he asserted that no defendant was an infant
although in fact one of the defendants was a minor.' 5 ' Without finding a violation of disciplinary rules, the Third Circuit
ordered the default judgment vacated under these circumstances. Again, this proceeding was ex parte only in a technical
sense as the senior attorney was aware of the intention of defendants to retain counsel to represent them in the proceed52
ing.1
In Singer Company v. Greever & Walsh Wholesale Textile,'5 3 the District Court set aside a default judgment where
there had been a written agreement between counsel for an
enlargement of time to answer, and plaintiff's counsel took the
default judgment while being aware that counsel for the defendant would be out of town at the time. Again, there was no
finding of a violation of disciplinary rules in the opening of the
default judgment.
In Dalminter,Inc. v. Edwards, Inc.," the court set aside
another default judgment. In this interesting case, a corporate
defendant, through its president, sent a letter to the attorney
for the plaintiff in response to a summons indicating that, "Our
answer to this complaint is that the Summons was served in
error since our Corporation was not chartered until [several
months after the incidents complained of]."' The defendant
corporation took no further action. When plaintiff's counsel
filed for a default judgment, he did not inform the court of this
letter which had not been filed with the court. The court found

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966).
Id at 914-15.
Id. at 915.
82 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
27 F.R.D. 491 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
Id. at 492 (quoting a letter from the attorney for the plaintiff).
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that plaintiff's counsel had a duty to inform the court of the
letter, particularly since a layperson might well have concluded
from the summons that a response directly to the plaintiff was
all that was required.'56 The court did not find any violation
of rules of conduct.
The case of Litton Systems v. American Telephone & Telegraph,'57 involved discovery abuse in an anti-trust case. The
federal district judge upheld the Magistrate's finding that
plaintiff's counsel had engaged in a "pattern of intentional
concealment of evidence"'58 related to part of the underlying
litigation. The attorney, without having reviewed all of the
deponent's files, had stated in connection with the taking of a
deposition that there were no other relevant documents of the
deponent. In fact, there were other documents in the
deponent's bottom drawer.'59 The attorney also misstated the
scope of an investigation by a new president of plaintiff's company.
The Court of Appeals upheld the imposition of sanctions of
over $10,000,000 against the plaintiff, although the sanctions
were not as great as those sought by the opposing party, agreeing with the trial court's finding that plaintiff's in-house counsel was "grossly negligent." 60 Thus, this case involved not a
mere failure to produce adverse evidence, but also an affirmative denial of the existence of such evidence.
In People v. Lewis, 6 ' a criminal defendant raised several
issues on appeal. Among those issues was his assertion that he
had been denied effective assistance of counsel at trial in that
his attorney had told the court that he was of the opinion that
the defendant was able to cooperate in his own defense and
was fit for trial and sentencing. The defendant had wanted his
attorney to assert that he was not capable of standing trial.
The appellate court held,
Where a defense attorney knows that his client is capable of
communicating intelligently, and the client, in an apparent
attempt to deceive the trier of fact, presents confused or selfcontradictory testimony, it is the ethical responsibility of

156.

Id. at 493.

157. 90 F.R.D. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
158. Id. at 413.

159. Id.
160. Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 826 (2d Cir. 1983).
161. 393 N.E.2d 1380 (:11. App. Ct. 1979).
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defense counsel to disclose to the trial court the facts as he
knows them. See Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility,
DR 7-102A(6) and (7); DR 7-102B(1).ce
This case seems to be more directed to a duty not to pursue a
fraudulent claim than a duty to introduce adverse evidence." 3
The case of Hennigan v. Harris County' also involved
matters of fraud. In this case, a constable brought a fraud
action against an attorney. The attorney had presented a writ
of execution to the constable with instructions to levy against a
property owned by an individual who had been under a duty to
pay the attorney fees arising out of a prior divorce action.
There was a hearing held on the matter, after which the party
owing the debt to the attorney paid the attorney by check in
the amount of most of the debt, marked "'Paid in full."" 65
The attorney deposited that check into his bank account. He
failed to inform the court of the payment, and subsequently the
court entered judgment against the constable. That judgment
became final, and the constable paid the attorney the full
amount of the debt. Approximately a year later, the constable
learned for the first time that the debt had already been paid
by the other party. The constable brought an action of fraud
against the attorney for concealing the fact that he had received payment from the opposing party. The court found that
the action of fraud was valid. "Where there is a duty to speak,
silence may be as misleading as a positive misrepresentation of
existing facts."'6 6 The court entered judgment against the attorney based upon his fraud. Clearly this case involves wrongful self-dealing on the part of the attorney and actual fraud
upon the court.
In Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc.,' the
court invalidated a patent on two grounds, the second of which
is pertinent here. When the patent holder filed its application
with the Patent Office, it failed to disclose information in its

162. Id. at 1384.
163. This case is startlingly similar to the subsequent Supreme Court decision
in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), in which the Court found no denial of

the right to assistance of counsel where the criminal defense attorney refused to
cooperate with the defendant in presenting perjured testimony.
164.
165.
166.
167.

593 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
Id. at 382.
Id. at 384.
428 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1970).
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possession regarding a prior unpatented device which had been
disclosed to the public by a published article and a public
speech, which device the court found to be substantially identical to the device which was then patented. The court cited
Supreme Court precedent:
Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office
or who are parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising duty to report to it all facts concerning possible
fraud or inequitableness underlying the applications in issue.... Public interest demands that all facts relevant to
such matters be submitted formally or informally to the Patent Office, which can then pass upon the sufficiency of the
evidence. Only in this way can that agency act to safeguard
the public in the first instance against fraudulent patent
monopolies."e
It is noteworthy that this case, like other Patent Office cases
cited in support of a duty to propound adverse information,'69
relies upon the specific nature of the Patent Office and its limited resources. Beckman also repeated the rationale of the Supreme Court in Pfizer & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission:7
'The Patent Office, not having testing facilities of its own, must
rely upon information furnished by applicants and their attorneys."17 1' The Beckman court further elaborated:

The Patent Office does not have full research facilities of its
own, and it has never been intended by Congress that it
should. In examining patents, the Office relies heavily upon
the prior art references that are cited to it by applicants. It is
therefore evident that our patent system could not function

168. Id. at 565 (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945) (emphasis added)). The Patent Office
has promulgated a regulation setting forth this duty. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1994); see
also 37 C.F.R. § 10.85 (1994).
169. Another patents case cited in the commentaries is Kingsland v. Dorsey,
338 U.S. 318 (1949). See Harold L. Marquis, An Appraisal of Attorneys' Responsibility Before Administrative Agencies, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 285, 298 (1976). In
Kingsland, the Court upheld the disbarment of an attorney from patent practice.
The per curiam opinion for the Court provides no details, but a strong dissent by
Justice Jackson indicates that the attorney had participated in ghost-writing a
trade journal article which was later presented to the Patent Office as having been
written by an apparently disinterested labor leader. There was no claim that the
article itself was false or misleading in any way.
170. 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969).
171. Beckman, 428 F.2d at 565 (quoting Pfizer, 401 F.2d at 579.).
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successfully if applicants were allowed to approach the Patent
Office as an arm's length adversary."'
To the extent that the Social Security Administration and its
contracting state agencies have significant personnel and the
ability, indeed duty, to obtain information with regard to
applicants' claims for disability, and to the extent that OHAs
have staff as well as the ability to bring in vocational and medical experts, the position of the Social Security Administration
appears to be markedly different from that of the Patent Office.
Whether SSA's ability to investigate claims should lead to a
different result in a social security case than in the patent case,
should a claim ever rise to the level of court, remains at this
point an open question.
VI.

A TENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DUTY TO PRODUCE UNDER
THE MODEL RULES

Against the confusion of the various bar opinions and the
silence of the courts on the subject, any conclusion on the basic
issue presented, as to the duty under the Model Rules to produce adverse evidence in a social security hearing, is necessarily tentative. Application of Rule 3.3(d) in those jurisdictions
which have adopted the Rules is dependent upon whether a
social security hearing is an ex parte proceeding within the
meaning of the Rules. While social security hearings have features that are similar to a classic ex parte proceeding, they
have other features that are markedly dissimilar. Although it
appears that the drafters of the Model Rules never specifically
contemplated social security hearings, or were silent if they
did, that does not answer the question. It is certainly not reasonable to expect that the drafters would specifically contemplate, much less name, every type of judicial and administrative proceeding in which attorneys represent clients.
I am forced to conclude that, despite the fact that social
security hearings involve an enormous administrative agency
with not only the duty but also the vast resources to investigate social security claims, and the fact that ALJs in many
ways do represent the government's interest, nevertheless, it
appears that social security cases are sufficiently akin to patent
cases that the ex parte rule should apply to them. The hearings

172. Id. at 564-65.
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are, in a technical sense, nonadversarial. While AIUs have a
duty to develop the record, they do not take the place of government attorneys. More importantly, they should not take the
place of government attorneys. They do not interview claimants
prior to a hearing, although an interview of sorts is conducted
by an SSA worker when the claimant initially applies. Those
attorneys who take the position that they are not under the obligations of Rule 3.3(d) in effect invite, practically compel, the
A.J to assume an adversarial position against their client.
If Rule 3.3(d) does apply to social security proceedings, a
number of questions still remain. The Rule requires a lawyer to
"inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer
which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision,
whether or not the facts are adverse."' 3 When is a fact
known to a lawyer? Even if a fact is "known" to a lawyer, is the
lawyer under a duty to investigate and obtain supporting documentation of that fact, either as her own obligation or if ordered to do so by an AUJ? Is the lawyer required to expend her
client's money or her own money to investigate and obtain
evidence which is potentially adverse to the client's case? Finally, what is a fact?
The terminology section of the Model Rules states that,
"'Knowingly,' 'known,' or 'knows' denotes actual knowledge of
the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred
from circumstances." 14 Just when a "fact" is "known" to an
attorney is a troubling epistemological problem." 5 Nevertheless, knowledge of a related legal proceeding involving a client's
medical condition could well demonstrate knowledge of the
existence of medical reports ordinarily generated in that type of
proceeding.
Perhaps the most troubling area for the social security bar
involves so-called "in.dependent medical examinations" (IMEs)
obtained by workers' compensation insurance carriers where
the claimant for disability has previously litigated a claim for
workers' compensation. It is a foregone conclusion that a contested workers' compensation case will always generate evidence adverse to the claimant. 6 It is not uncommon that a

173.
174.
175.
currence
176.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) (1993).
MODEL RULES, supra note 58, at 11.
For a brief, but telling, exegesis of the subject, see Justice Stevens' conin Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 190-91 (1986).
A similar situation would likely occur had there been a contested personal
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claimant for benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act
has previously asserted an on-the-job injury in a workers' compensation case. In many instances, the same attorney who is
representing the claimant in the social security claim, or another attorney in the same firm, has represented the claimant in
the workers' compensation claim. In other cases the social
security representative will be aware of a previous workers'
compensation case.
It is critical to an understanding of the depth of the bar's
concern to realize that these medical examinations are only
independent in the sense that the doctor is not the claimant's
doctor. 7' The examinations are performed by physicians who
are under contract to the workers' compensation insurance
carriers and who understand full well the economic interests of
the party who pays the bill.178 If the IME is simply submitted
to the Social Security AIJ, a highly adversarial report will
become evidence in a nonadversarial proceeding, with the grave
danger of impairing the truth-seeking function and skewing the
results. If the claimant's case is before an ALJ who tends to
seize upon any piece of adverse evidence to deny a claim, production of the IME will almost inevitably be fatal to the client's
claim for disability benefits. As noted previously, when the
claim is reviewed on the substantial evidence test, some courts
will then uphold the denial of benefits even though the great
weight of evidence supports the claim of disability.7 9 Indeed,
this may well happen even if the workers' compensation referee
or appellate tribunal discredited the IME and awarded
workers' compensation.'
Rule 3.3(d) itself does not contain a duty to obtain material
facts, only a duty to inform a tribunal of material facts. If the
existence of a prior workers' compensation claim is a "fact,"
then it would appear that there is a duty to inform the ALJ of
a prior workers' compensation proceeding. It does not necessar-

injury action involving the claimant.
177. See Thomas J. Vesper, Who's Afraid of the Independent Medical Examiner?, TRIAL, Dec. 1993, at 29.
178. Such doctors tend to be at least as adversarial as SSA's consulting physicians of whom Justice Douglas said "[t]he use by HEW of its stable of defense
doctors without submitting them to cross-examination is the cutting of corners-a
practice in which certainly the Government should not indulge." Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 414 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
179. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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ily follow, however, that the A.J then has a right to compel the
attorney to obtain the adverse evidence against his client. Nevertheless, many AL~s seem to believe that they have such
power. 181 Thus, the attorney becomes compelled to work
against her own client, often at her own expense.
Interestingly, none of the various state court opinions on
this subject have addressed the distinction between fact and
opinion. Rule 3.3(d) is limited to a duty to disclose material
facts, not opinions. Anyone who has ever dealt with forensic
medicine will readily understand that the distinction between a
medical fact and a medical opinion is an elusive one at
best.8 2 Moreover, it is quite common for medical reports and
depositions to contain, a mix of fact and opinion. For example, a
single medical report could contain a "fact" that a blood test
indicated a non-therapeutic level of anti-convulsive medication,
coupled with the doctor's opinion that the patient was not regularly taking that medication. If there is a duty to produce facts,
the attorney may be effectively compelled to produce adverse
opinions that are part of the same document.
VII.

1994 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENT ADDRESSING
FRAUDULENT CLAIMS

The Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994 contains a section entitled "Expansion of the
authority of the Social Security Administration to prevent,
detect, and terminate fraudulent claims for OASDI and SSI
benefits,""s which adds a new section 1129 to the Social Security Act, effective October 1, 1994, reading, in pertinent part:
CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR
TITLES II AND XVI.
(a)(1) Any person (including an organization, agency, or other
entity) who makes, or causes to be made, a statement or representation of a material fact for use in determining any
initial or continuing right to or the amount of(A) monthly insurance benefits under title II, or

181. See supra text acoempanying note 117.

182. In a society that cannot agree on who is a living human being (Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)) and who is effectively a dead one (Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla.
1992)), one might reasonably wonder whether there are any medical "facts" at all.
183. The Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-296, § 206, 108 Stat. 1464, 1509-16 (1994).
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(B) benefits or payments under title XVI,
that the person knows or should know is false or misleading
or knows or should know omits a materialfact or makes such
a statement with knowing disregard for the truth shall be
subject to, in addition to any other penalties that may be
prescribed by law, a civil money penalty of not more than
$5,000 for each such statement or representation. Such person also shall be subject to an assessment, in lieu of damages
sustained by the United States because of such statement or
representation, of not more than twice the amount of benefits
or payments
paid as a result of such a statement or represen18 4
tation.
The statutory definition of "a material fact" is curiously circular:
(2) For purposes of this section, a material fact is one which
the Secretary may consider in evaluating whether an applicant is entitled to benefits under title II or eligible for benefits or payments under title XVI."8 '
In this subsection, "one" clearly relates back to "fact," thus
maintaining the fact/opinion distinction. Query: is it a fact that
an IME has expressed the opinion that someone is a malingerer? If it were, the distinction would be effectively eliminated.
While one may doubt that the authors of this amendment
really considered the attorney's ethical dilemma caused by
knowledge or possession of adverse evidence,18 it cannot be
denied that the language is remarkably similar to Rule 3.3(d)
of the Model Rules. Like Rule 3.3(d), moreover, it fails to resolve the difficult issues of mixed fact and opinion evidence and
the proper role (if any) of medical reports generated in a prior
adversarial proceeding in adjudicating social security claims. It
likewise fails to address an advocate's duty-if any-to obtain
such evidence, or clearly delineate the scope of client confidentiality.
Further, by adding the threat of civil penalties, without
clarifying the ethical obligation of attorneys facing genuine
184. Id. at 1510 (emphasis added).
185. Id.

186. The Report of the House-Senate Conference Committee on the Act is silent in this regard. Social Security Administrative Reform Act of 1994, [CCH Special 11 Unemployment Ins. Rep. with Soc. Security (CCH) No. 7, Pt. 3, at 144-45
(Aug. 22, 1994).
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dilemmas, the new provision is especially troubling. Now the
attorney is caught between risking a disciplinary complaint by
her client on the one hand (as noted by the Virginia State Bar
opinion letter)' and facing severe financial sanctions on the
other. This is all the more unfortunate since the section never
specifically addresses the attorney's dual roles as advocate and
"officer of the legal system.""
VIII.

THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE ZEALOUS PRACTITIONER

Notwithstanding all the legitimate concerns of the bar
outlined above, I join those advocates who continue to believe
that in the long run it is not only consistent with the Rules of
Conduct, but also with the best interests of clients, to produce
all relevant evidence at a social security ALJ hearing." 9 I assert that this position is not only prudent in terms of the
attorney's good standing with the bar, but also as a litigation
strategy.
I am well aware of situations in which there is a complete
breakdown of goodwill between certain advocates and the ALJs
before whom they appear, and this is most unfortunate. Nevertheless, in the long run I believe that the clients will be better
served by full disclosure for several reasons. First, if the attorney submits the adverse evidence, she can use that opportunity
to explain to the ALJ why it should not defeat her client's
claim. If the ALJ learns of this evidence from other sources, it
will be too late to undo the harmful effect of the evidence.'"
Second, it should never be forgotten that ultimately, any ALJ is
engaged in the job of judging. The ALT necessarily judges not
only the client but also the attorney. The great bulk of cases
will inevitably involve some judgment calls. If the A.J does not
fully trust the attorney who practices before her, if the ALJ
believes that the attorney may be hiding relevant, harmful evidence, it is most unlikely that the AUJ will exercise that judgment in favor of that attorney and that attorney's client. Third,
if the ALJ believes that the attorney is hiding relevant evidence, this will almost inevitably provoke the AUJ to adopt

187. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
188. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 58, at 7.
189. I am joined in this view by Charles Hall, Esq., a
yprominent social security practitioner and author. CHARLES T. HALL, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY PRACTICE § 2.52 (West's Handbook Series, 1993 ed., 1993).
190. Id.
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more of the role of government advocate against the client
rather than the appropriate role of fact finder.
Based on many years of social security practice, I believe
that most ALJs are more likely to render favorable decisions
when they have a complete record, when they feel they are
being dealt with honestly, and when they know that the attorney who is presenting the claim is a zealous advocate who will
make sure that the decision is correct by appealing that case as
far as necessary if the decision is not legally supportable.
Moreover, the social security regulations provide a practiway
to deal with the adverse medical report generated on
cal
behalf of an adversary in another legal proceeding. The zealous
advocate can and should seek to have the AIM subpoena the
doctor who made the report to the social security hearing.19 '
There is a growing body of authority that a claimant has a
right to have the AJ subpoena such a doctor to the hearing for
purposes of cross-examination." If the ALJ refuses to issue
the subpoena, or the doctor fails to comply, this would be a
basis to exclude the adverse report or its use as substantial evidence.'93 Indeed, the failure of claimant's counsel to exercise
"his right to subpoena the reporting physician!" " was a key
factor relied upon by the Supreme Court in Richardson v.
Perales9 5 to uphold the use of medical consultants' reports

without cross-examination.
IX. THE NEED FOR RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR
ADmINISTRATIVE ADVOCACY

As should by now be clear, the current state of the law on
the professional responsibilities of the advocate in the realm of
social security administrative proceedings is totally unsettled.
As correctly noted by the Virginia State Bar Counsel, this plac-

191. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950(d), 416.1450(d); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 402, 404-05 (1971).

192. See, e.g., Lidy v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 959 (1991); Wallace v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1988); Souch v.
Califano, 599 F.2d 577, 580 (4th Cir. 1979); Goan v. Shalala, 853 F. Supp. 218
(S.D.W. Va. 1994).
193. See, e.g., Lidy v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1990). Without the
inducement of a fee similar to those a doctor normally receives from the workers'
compensation insurance carrier, it is doubtful that most doctors would comply with
such a subpoena.
194. Perales, 402 U.S. at 402.
195. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
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es the attorney in a true dilemma.' 9 If she does not comply
with an AL's direction to produce adverse evidence, she runs
the risk of both adverse action against her client and a disciplinary proceeding and possible punishment for herself. If she
complies with the AI's request or otherwise produces adverse
evidence, she runs the risk of not only losing the case and the
fee, but also having the client make a complaint to the disciplinary authorities.'97 Moreover, as has been seen, the few
bars that are now addressing this issue are taking different approaches, and individual ALJs and OHAs, apparently without
rule-making authority, have taken it upon themselves to issue
their own, non-uniform edicts on the subject. 9 ' The Social
Security Administration has long emphasized its desire to have
national standards, 99 and the current situation is the antithesis of such standards.
Almost twenty years ago, Professor Harold Marquis argued
for the need to have a joint bar-agency committee draft a Code
of Ethics covering the different types of administrative proceedings and perhaps supplemental rules tailored to the unique
proceedings of the particular agencies."e Clearly that need is
at least as great today, and the 1994 fraud amendment to the
Social Security Act may provide the necessary impetus. Indeed,
SSA's September 1994 Plan for a New Disability Claim Process
calls for the agency to "establish a code of professional conduct
for representatives in all matters before SSA."2 '
Any such set of rules should also govern the responsibilities of individuals who are not members of the bar, but who
practice before those agencies on anything other than an individual volunteer basis. There is some precedent for state courts

196. See supra part IV.D.
197. Id.
198. See supra part IV.
199. This is the stated justification for the Secretary's policy of nonacquiescence. See Comment, The Doctrine of Nonacquiescence, 13 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 9,

16 (1985).
200. Marquis, supra note 169, at 314.
201. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PLAN FOR A NEW DISABILITY CLAIM
PROCESS 42 (SSA Pub. No. 01-005, 1994). In February 1995, the Office of Hearings
and Appeals proposed a set of "Rules of Conduct and Standards of Responsibility

for Representatives." While the proposal was drafted, unfortunately, without any
involvement of the practicing bar, SSA has at least solicited comments on it. The
proposal fails to address many of the difficult issues raised herein with any specificity. A revised draft, made available in April 1995 and on file with the author,
provides somewhat more specificity, but remains deficient in a number of respects
in dealing with these difficult issues.
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taking the view that they can regulate the conduct of non-attorneys engaging in a quasi-legal practice. 2 The Patent Office
has dealt with the problem by promulgating a rule by which
the Code of Professional Responsibility was made applicable to
registered patent agents who are not attorneys.0 3 In the last
several years, the Social Security Administration has seen a
number of non-attorneys engaged in regular practice before
Social Security ALJs. Clearly, if it is unethical for a licensed
attorney to fail to produce certain evidence in an AJ hearing,
it cannot be ethical for a nonlicensed professional advocate to
engage in similar conduct. 2°4 Indeed, the Social Security Act
gives the Secretary explicit power to prescribe rules and regulations for "agents or other persons" representing claimants and
to suspend or prohibit from further practice
"any such person,
20 5
agent, or attorney who refuses to comply."

The obvious danger is that the Administration would be
tempted to promulgate rules of a draconian nature intended to
disadvantage claimants and their attorneys rather than honestly perform a truth-seeking function. For this reason, a joint
bar-agency committee would be critical to the process. In his
memo to the Charleston AUJ of April 1992, the United States
Acting Chief Administrative Law Judge expressed his desire for
"good relations between all Judges ...

and all members of the

Bar to exist."26 He further opined that "we must build a consensus of opinion on this issue."207
It will ultimately not serve the interests of the Administration, the bar, or, most importantly, the claimants, for SSA to
insist on the production of medical reports generated in adversarial proceedings, only to have advocates insist on the
issuance of subpoenas which are unlikely to be honored. This
will hardly enhance the administrative adjudicative process
and its valid truth-seeking role. It would be more consistent
with the benevolent purposes of the Social Security Act for the

202. See Triffin v. DiSalvo, 643 A.2d 118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
203. David J. Henry, Ethics in United States Patent Practice, 62 A.B.A. J. 465
(1976). See generally 37 C.F.R. § 10 (1994).
204. I wish to make it clear that I would not seek to apply any such rules to
the individual who, on a one-time, uncompensated basis, represents a friend or
family member in a social security hearing. It is not reasonable to believe that
such individuals would even be familiar with formal rules of conduct.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1988).
206. U.S. ALT Memorandum, supra note 10, at 4.
207. Id.
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Administration to recognize that requiring the production of
such potentially highly prejudicial adversarial reports in what
is ostensibly a nonadversarial adjudicative process is not particularly useful, and is, ultimately, simply inappropriate.

